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ABSTRACT 
National antitrust policies have potentially profound effects on global 
competitiveness of individual industries. Public policy interventions affecting 
organizational arrangements within industries, enforcement of commodity 
standardization, and price competition, as well as the regulation of intellectual 
property rights, are the major tools by which Government executes antitrust 
policies.  This study documents the frequency, extent, and impact of U.S. antitrust 
policies toward the pulp and paper industry between 1950 and 1990.  
Passage of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act in 1950 marked the beginning of a 
new antitrust experience across the whole U.S. economy.  Yet, the application of 
the Act required government to forge industry specific standards of competitive 
structure.  The antitrust experience of the pulp and paper industry, and its distinct 
segments, was particularly industry specific when it came to the enforcement of 
Celler-Kefauver Act and its consequences.  
Between 1950 and 1990, antitrust disadvantaged pulp and paper firms whose 
competitive strategy was based on regional or product specialization.   As in other 
industries, antitrust appeared to encourage successful and growth-seeking paper 
firms to diversify into new areas of business.  Unlike in other industries, successful 
pulp and paper firms relatively rarely undertook so-called conglomerate mergers, 
and preferred to diversify and expand into other segments of the forests products 
industry.  In the context of pulp and paper industry, new incentive structures that 
emanated from antitrust facilitated the rise of large scale forests products giants 
that resembled each other in terms of strategy and structure.  
Antitrust between 1950 and 1990 shaped significantly the competitive structure of 
the U.S. pulp and paper industry, and probably transformed traditional 
arrangements for technological learning and the course of technological 
innovation.  Industry’s recent performance and contemporary global 
competitiveness outlook cannot be understood without reference to its post-World 
War II antitrust experience.  
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Introduction 
Antitrust intervention in the United States pulp and paper industry since 1950 
has received little attention from scholars of the industry.1  Yet influential students of 
economy and business argue that antitrust is one of the central forces shaping 
industries and their evolution.2  This report has grown out of an effort to document and 
understand federal antitrust intervention in the U.S. pulp and paper industry between 
1950 and 1990, and thereby to improve our ability to understand the industry’s 
evolutionary dynamics. 
The report seeks to answer the following historical questions:  How much  
antitrust policy intervention occurred between 1950 and 1990?  What statutes were 
most often applied by antitrust officials?  What industry sectors attracted the most 
legal challenges?  Did antitrust shape the behavior of firms and managers, and if so, 
how?  Answers to these questions enable us to gain an overview of the role of public 
policy in shaping the competitive structure of the U.S. pulp and paper industry 
between 1950 and 1990, and into the future. 
Without exception, the period under study has been characterized by scholars 
of business and the economy as a period of unprecedented merger mania and intense 
                                                 
1 The best overview of antitrust in the pulp and paper industry prior to 1950 is: Simon N. Whitney, 
Antitrust Policies. American Experience in Twenty Industries. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund 
1958, 330-384. A study devoted to the political economy of newsprint is: L. Ethan Ellis, Newsprint. 
Producers, Publishers, and Political Pressures. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press 1960. For the 
period between 1950 and 1980, see: Hannes Toivanen, Historical Perspectives on Contemporary 
Problems: Organizational Capabilities and Strategy and Structure of Large Pulp and Paper Firms, 
1950-1980. Chicago: Tappi Press 2003. See also: Hannes Toivanen, Learning and Corporate Strategy: 
The Dynamic Evolution of North American Pulp and Paper Industry, 1860-1960. Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. Atlanta, GA: Georgia Institute of Technology 2004. 
2 The literature is too vast to be exhausted here. Illustrative are: Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of 
Regulation. Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press 1984, Peter Temin and Louis Galambos, The Fall of 
the Bell System. A Study in Prices and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press 1987; Louis 
Galambos and Joseph Pratt, The Rise of Corporate Commonwealth. United States Business and Public 
Policy in the 19th Century. New York: Basic Books 1988; Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of 
Corporate Control. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1990; Kenneth Lipartito and David B. 
Sicilia (eds), Constructing Corporate America: History, Politics, and Culture. New York: Oxford 
University Press 2004. 
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antitrust intervention with mixed outcomes for the competitiveness of U.S. industries.3 
The onset of merger activity in the post-World War II U.S prompted serious political 
response, and on December 29, 1950, the Congress passed legislation that gave 
antitrust officials expanded and improved ability to intervene in corporate mergers. 
The new Section 7 of the Clayton Act, customarily called the Celler-Kefauver Act 
after the senators who sponsored the bill, was the most important piece of antitrust 
legislation since the enactments of Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
The Celler-Kevaufer Act allowed the Federal Trade Commission and the 
Department of Justice to prevent mergers and order divestiture if a given combination 
would have significantly lessened or threatened to lessen competition in a given line of 
commerce.  Previous antitrust legislation centered on fair trade practices and 
cartelization, and was a less efficient tool for public policy to shape organizational 
arrangements within industries. 
Antitrust officials regarded the Celler-Kefauver Act as one of their primary 
tools to maintain the competitive structure of American economy, and the increasing 
number of mergers intensified this emphasis during the post-World War II decades.  In 
1952, the Federal Trade Commission observed some 720 mergers a year, a rate at 
which merger activity remained for a long time, until it accelerated rapidly in the mid-
1960s.  In 1969, the Commission argued that disappearance of firms through mergers 
and acquisitions had reached unprecedented proportions, and its officials were 
swamped with cases as the number of mergers reviewed by the Commission increased 
from 600 in 1966 to over 4,000 by 1969.  Conglomerate mergers accounted for 84 
percent of the assets of all recorded mergers in 1969.   As the merger movement in the 
                                                 
3 This is most clearly stated in: Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press 1990; See also: Louis Galambos, “The Monopoly Enigma, the Reagan 
Administration’s Antitrust Experiment, and the Global Economy.” In Lipartito and Sicilia (eds), 
Constructing Corporate America, 149-167; Walter Adams and James W. Brock, “The ‘New Learning’ 
and the Euthanasia of Antitrust,” California Law Review Vol 74:5 (October 1986):1515-1566. 
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American economy reached unprecedented proportions, annual reports of Federal 
Trade Commission voiced alarming concerns over its consequences.  Its studies 
confirmed that the largest manufacturing companies played a very central role in the 
merger movement, and antitrust officials warned of potential effects on the competitive 
structure of the U.S. economy.  In response to these concerns, the Commission placed 
a high priority upon enforcement of the Celler-Kefauver Act during that decade, and 
the Department of Justice shared this policy.4 
 
Table 1. Major pulp and paper U.S. government antimerger cases in order 
of year of merger, completion of the legal case, and type of merger between 1950 
and 1990. 
Merger Compl. Acquirer Acquired  Type 
1954 1961 Crown Zellerbach St Helens Pulp and Paper h 
1956 1957 International Paper Long-Bell Lumber bv 
1951-6 1962 Scott Paper Company 3 pulp firms bv 
 1966 St. Regis Paper  3 corrugated box firms fh 
1958- 1966 Union Bag-Camp 5 corrugated box firms fh 
1960 1966 Inland General Box Company fh 
1960 1966 Westvaco U.S. Envelope Company fv 
1961 1967 Kimberly-Clark BMT fv 
1961 1968 Champion Carpenter Paper and others fv 
1961 1970 Mead Several paper distributors fv 
1961 1977 Hammermill Western Newspaper fv 
1966 1977 Hammermill Carter Rice fv 
1981 1981 Weyerhauser Menasha Corporation fv 
1984 1986 Champion St. Regis h 
 1987 St. James River Flexible Packaging Division  
   of Princeton Packaging h* 
*Merger abandoned before case concluded 
h = horizontal merger bv = backward vertical merger, fv= forward vertical 
merger 
 
The character and effectiveness of antimerger efforts by government repeatedly 
became a matter of concern in American politics.  Several scholars, business leaders, 
and politicians argued that antitrust practices undermined the competitiveness of U.S. 
                                                 
4 Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1952. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 19582 32; Annual Report of the Federal Trade 
Commission For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1958. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 
1958, 24.; Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1969. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1969, 7. 
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industries.  The primary charge against the Celler-Kefauver Act was that it induced 
successful and growth-seeking corporations to diversify into unrelated areas of 
business, and thereby undermined the ability of these corporations to draw on their 
specialized organizational and technological capabilities.5 
The pulp and paper industry followed other industries in its merger mania and 
gave rise to similar concerns.  Antitrust officials instituted several cases in the industry 
in order to shape and check merger activity.  The major cases are listed in Table 1.  (As 
with the remainder of this report, the table is limited to pulp and paper cases only and 
omits plywood and other forests products cases.)  When pulp and paper managers 
responded to competitive pressures with mergers and acquisitions, their corporate 
strategies collided repeatedly with the new antitrust policy. 
Government’s antitrust intervention into the competitive structure of the pulp 
and paper industry between 1950 and 1990 was both extensive and frequent.  It had 
wide-ranging effects on the competitive strategy of individual firms, on the structure 
and health of various industry segments, and ultimately on the competitiveness of the 
entire industry.  In addition, the report suggests that antimerger activity and cartel 
policing addressed the same dynamic forces of industry evolution, but from different 
ends.  This tentative conclusion deserves more attention and research in the future. 
The antitrust experience of individual pulp and paper industry segments 
appears to have been patterned similarly, and followed an identical cycle.  Most 
industry segments were characterized by intensive merger activity after World War II 
and during the 1960s.  This also invited heightened scrutiny by antitrust officials, who 
                                                 
5 Galambos, “The Monopoly Enigma, the Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Experiment, and the 
Global Economy,” In Lipartito and Sicilia (eds), Constructing Corporate America, 149-167;Galambos 
and Pratt, The Rise of Corporate Commonwealth; Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate 
Control; Walter Adams and James W. Brock, “The ‘New Learning’ and the Euthanasia of Antitrust,” 
California Law Review Vol 74:5 (October 1986)1515-1566. See especially articles and literature cited 
in: David J. Teece and Thomas M. Jorde (eds), Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness. New York: 
Oxford University Press 1992. 
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forged antimerger standards specific to each segment of the industry.  Legal 
precedents, divestiture orders, and policy interventions were major practices through 
which government officials shaped the competitive environment in merger cases.  
Such activity swept through the sanitary paper, paper container, fine and printing 
paper, board, and other industry segments between 1950 and 1970. 
 
Table 2. Major pulp and paper cartel cases 1950-1990 
International Cellucotton (1951) 
U.S. v. Container Corporation et al (1967) 
Corrugated Container Antitrust (1977) 
Folding Carton Antitrust (1977) 
Fine Paper Antitrust (1978) 
 
It is very striking how the character and focus of government antitrust efforts 
changed over the 1970s, when antimerger cases declined in number and importance 
and antitrust policy centered on high profile cartel cases (Table 2).  This observation 
highlights the need for future research to consider how cycles of antitrust co-evolved 
with changes in industry structure and competitive dynamics, including closer study of 
how antitrust enforcement and the evolution of organizational structures may have 
shaped the course of technological innovation.6 
 
                                                 
6 Literature on the relationship between antitrust, innovation, and competitiveness is increasing rapidly. 
For the purposes of this report, see: David M. Hart, “Antitrust and Technological Innovation in the U.S: 
Ideas, Institutions, Decisions, and Impacts, 1890-2000.” Research Policy Vol 30:6 (Jul 2001):923-937: 
Steven W. Usselman, “Fostering a Capacity for Compromise: Business, Governmnent, and the Stages of 
Innovation in American Computing.” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, Vol 18, No. 2 
(1996):30-39; For a call to relaxation of antitrust in order to boost innovation, see: Michael L. 
Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester, and Robert M. Solow, Made in America. Regaining The Produdctive 
Edge. New York: HarperPerennial 1989. Contrasting and more classic view is offered in: Michael L. 
Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: The Free Press 1990; Studies bearing directly 
upon pulp and paper industry after 1990 are: Toivanen, Learning and Corporate Strategy; Toivanen, 
Historical Perspectives on Contemporary Problems; Martin Pesendorf, “Horizontal mergers in the paper 
industry.” RAND Journal of Economics Vol 34, No. 3, Autumn 2003, 495-515; Laurits R. Christensen 
and Richard E. Caves, “Cheap talk and investment rivalry in the pulp and paper industry.“ Journal of 
Industrial Economics Vol. 45 (March 1997):1, 47-74. 
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Beginning of a new antitrust experience: Sanitary paper industry in the 
1950s 
The Federal Trade Commission case in 1951 against International Cellucotton 
Products Company, a subsidiary of Kimberly-Clark Corporation, marked the 
beginning of a distinct antitrust experience for the U.S. pulp and paper industry. 
Managers of International Cellucotton struggled to maintain the company’s leading 
position in the sanitary paper industry in the face of intensifying competition, but post-
World War II antitrust policy was designed to prevent concentration in specialized 
market segments.  Although the case was not based on the recently amended Celler-
Kefauver Act, it involved the very questions of competitive industry structure the new 
amendment was intended to address.7 
The International Cellucotton case illustrated in particular how maturation of 
technology, expiration of intellectual property rights, and structural change in the U.S. 
pulp and paper industry introduced new competitive pressures into highly specialized 
market segments.  FTC investigators alleged that International Cellucotton used tying 
and exclusive-dealing contracts in the sale of its Kotex sanitary napkins and Kleenex 
facial tissues.  The complaint charged that the trade practices prevented  merchants 
from exercising “free and independent judgment in selecting sources of supply.”8  
The charges implied that a product innovation once considered unique and 
proprietary had become a basic commodity, and thus indicated how the strategic value 
of innovation and imitation had undergone a transformation in the industry.  Kimberly-
Clark Corporation had produced an amazing array of innovative sanitary paper 
products, such as sanitary napkins, facial tissues, and feminine hygienic products, in 
the early 20th century, and had devised a distinct strategy to protect the lucrative 
                                                 
7 Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1951. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1951, 41. 
8 Annual Report, 1951, 41. 
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markets it had created.  Strong and broad patents covered the basic manufacturing 
processes, and the company created equally strong brand names for its products, such 
as Kotex and Kleenex.  The new business was organized in a special unit, International 
Cellucotton Products Company.9 
Kimberly-Clark’s efforts to protect its lucrative and rapidly growing sanitary 
paper business were relatively successful until the mid-1940s, when patent expiration 
and technological change in kraft pulping and bleaching prompted industry imitation. 
Perhaps the most significant case of such strategic imitation was undertaken by a 
powerful Wisconsin papermaker, Clark D. Everest, who decided to enter new paper 
product markets in the early 1950s.  Relying on new bleaching technology for kraft 
pulp and paper, Everest ordered his research and development staff to imitate 
Kimberly-Clark sanitary products.  Imitation and entry of firms in the sanitary paper 
business underlined the importance of internal economies and distribution networks for 
managers of incumbent firms, such as Kimberly-Clark and Scott Paper Company.10 
In this context of technological and industrial change, antitrust officials alleged 
that International Cellucotton, which in the Commission’s assessment “substantially 
dominated the field,” used unfair trade practices to frustrate the distribution of 
competitors’ products through national dealer networks.  The case complemented the 
larger, emerging antitrust policy framework that emphasized consumer welfare and 
sought to prevent concentration in narrow industry segments.  The  pulp and paper 
industry was particularly vulnerable to such a policy because of its fragmented 
                                                 
9 Robert Spector, Shared Values: a History of Kimberly-Clark. Lyme, Ct.: Greenwich Publishing Group 
1997. 
10 Hannes Toivanen, Learning and Corporate Strategy: The Dynamics Evolution of the North American 
Pulp and Paper Industry. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Atlanta, Georgia Institute of Technology 
2004, 204-206. 
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organization, with numerous standardized product segments reaching from newsprint, 
milk cartons, fancy wrapping paper, to plywood.11 
The International Cellucotton case marked the beginning of a distinct antitrust 
regime in the pulp and paper industry, because it suggested an emerging conflict 
between the internal dynamics of the industry and antitrust policy.  Across several 
different segments of the pulp and paper industry, managers faced problems associated 
with maturation of technology, expiration of intellectual property rights, and acute 
shortages of materials.  These challenges prompted paper companies to revisit 
strategies of vertical integration.  While International Cellucotton clearly violated old 
Clayton Act statutes of unfair trade practices, the case concealed and impeded its 
attempts to deal with these new competitive pressures. 
Mergers and acquisitions offered managers an obvious mechanism to respond 
to such pressures, and, along other U.S. industries, pulp and paper witnessed 
unprecedented merger mania.  This response accentuated  the conflict between  the 
internal dynamics of the pulp and paper industry and new antitrust policy as 
culminated in Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended on December 29, 1950.  It was 
only a matter of time before pulp and paper companies faced additional antitrust 
scrutiny under the new law.  
In the sanitary paper industry, such a case followed quickly on the heels of the 
International Cellucotton case.  In 1956, the FTC alleged that recent acquisitions by 
Scott Paper Company, then the largest producer of sanitary paper, violated the 
amended Section 7.  The FTC ordered divestiture.  Pennsylvanian Scott had  
established his firm as a non-integrated paper merchant house around 1900, and its 
management had pioneered new sales, advertising, and distribution techniques in the 
                                                 
11 Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1952. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1952, 27; Federal Trade Commission, Docket No. 5883, 
International Cellucotton Products.  
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mass consumer paper markets, paying special attention to the emerging sanitary paper 
products such as napkins and toilet paper.  For a long period, the company remained a 
pure merchant house, but after World War II its managers intensively pursued 
backward integration into pulp and paper production.12 
The acquisition policy of Scott was part of a broader effort by its management 
to reach out from its traditional East Coast markets and establish the company as the 
leading national, fully integrated producer of consumer sanitary paper products.  In 
order to secure its paper supply, the company acquired a specialized pulp manufacturer 
in Washington state, Soundview, for about $60 million in 1951.  It followed with 
acquisitions of Detroit Sulphite & Pulp Company in 1954 for about $11 million and of  
Massachusetts Hollingsworth & Whitney Company  for $38 million later that same 
year.  All of these companies specialized in the manufacture of pulp, and Scott 
invested further about $50 million to add sanitary paper manufacturing machines at the 
acquired mills.13 
The Scott case opened a standards-setting process at the FTC.  Congress had 
not set clear measures for what constituted an illegal merger.  The FTC examiner in 
charge of the Scott case initially concluded that the Celler-Kefauver Act had not been 
violated, but the Commission quickly appealed the case and issued a divestiture order 
again in 1959.  The FTC now emphasized Scott’s dominant position in sanitary paper 
markets, in particular in those lines of paper products that were distributed through 
groceries and supermarkets.  Scott’s total shipments of all sanitary paper products had 
increased from 317,213 tons in 1950 to 504,216 in 1955, and its respective share of 
national markets had increased from 27 percent to 33.  In smaller niches, the company 
controlled even larger market shares.  It claimed 60 percent of the retail market for 
                                                 
12 Federal Trade Commission, Docket 6559. Scott Paper Company (1956). 
13 Scott Paper Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 301 F.2d 579 (1962). 
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paper towels and roughly half of the retail market for regular grade toilet tissue.  The 
FTC required Scott to divest fully its acquisitions and refrain for ten yeas from 
acquiring pulp and paper companies.  Scott unsuccessfully challenged the ruling, and a 
final decision was handed down against the firm in 1964.14 
Antitrust intervention in the sanitary paper industry during the 1950’s 
significantly shaped the ability of leading firms to forge competitive strategies.  The 
International Cellucotton ruling enforced strict competitive trade practices, while the 
FTC divestiture order in the Scott case defined political economy for the whole pulp 
and paper industry.  Political economy did not favor, to say the very least, incumbent 
sanitary firms looking to deepen their specialization within certain market segments.  
Rather, public policy encouraged such firms to diversify into related paper product 
segments. 
 
Regional specialization and antitrust in the 1950s  
A central aspect of the new antitrust experience was the way antimerger laws 
shaped leading firms’ strategies of growth.  The Scott case exemplified how antitrust 
policy encouraged product diversification.  Two other important antimerger cases 
demonstrated similar policy goals in regard to regional specialization.  In the 1950s, 
government pursued two antimerger investigations into the Pacific pulp and paper 
industry that established legal precedents with wide implications for the whole national 
industry.  The cases against the two largest U.S. pulp and paper firms, Crown 
Zellerbach Corporation and International Paper Company, set policy standards 
                                                 
14 Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1959. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1959, 36-37; The statistics are quoted from: Scott Paper 
Company v. Federal Trade Commission (1962); Scott Paper Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 
No. 13, 537 (1964). 
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regarding how regional giants could expand within home markets and enter new 
regions.15 
In February 1954,  the FTC challenged under the Celler-Kefauver Act the 
acquisition of St. Helens Pulp and Paper Company by the Crown Zellerbach 
Corporation (hereafter C-Z).  San Francisco-based C-Z was one of the world’s largest 
pulp and paper manufacturers, with assets totaling almost $250 million.  The FTC 
alleged the merger created a monopoly in the Western kraft paper markets.16 
C-Z mills controlled about half of the kraft paper markets in three Pacific Coast 
states.  Tacoma, Washington-based St. Helens controlled twenty percent.  Longview 
Fiber Company, controlled by International Paper, was the only significant competitor 
in the Western kraft paper markets, with its fifteen percent market share.  C-Z 
manufactured practically all kinds of coarse and fine papers, whereas St. Helens 
specialized exclusively on coarse papers.  The FTC alleged that the merger limited 
supply of kraft papers to paper jobbers and paper converters in an already oligopolistic 
market, and ordered C-Z to divest St. Helens, a ruling confirmed by the federal 
Appeals Court in 1962.17 
The FTC won the case by demonstrating how the combination controlled 
regional markets.  C-Z would have controlled some 60 percent of Western coarse 
paper markets, and much higher shares in specialized paper grades.  In addition, the 
combination would have reduced the supply of paper to independent paper converters 
and thus reduced competition in paper products, such as paper bags.  In bag paper, the 
combination would have controlled 80 per cent of Western markets.  St. Helens was an 
important element for the competitive structure of the Pacific paper bag industry, 
                                                 
15 David C. Smith, History of Papermaking In The United States, 1691-1969. New York:Lockwood 
Publishing Ltd 1970, 539. 
16 Federal Trade Commission, Docket 6180. Crown Zellerbach Corporation. 
17 Federal Trade Commission, Docket 6180. Crown Zellerbach Corporation; Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. 
Federal Trade Commission, 296 F.2d 800, (1961). 
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because it had no paper bag converting operations, and sold most of its bag paper 
through independent paper jobbers who distributed paper to specialized converting 
firms.  C-Z, on the contrary, operated large bag converting plants supplied by its own 
paper mills.  The bag paper it sold unconverted was mostly distributed through 
Zellerbach Paper Company, its wholly owned subsidiary paper merchant house.18 
The case marked a culmination point for the evolution of the Pacific pulp and 
paper industry, which constituted a relatively independent industrial organization from 
the rest of the nation.  Together, the Mid-West, Southern, Middle-Atlantic, and 
Northeast regions constituted a relatively well integrated geographical paper market, 
where mills from all different regions competed for the same customers.  The same 
firms operated in all of these regions because the expansion of the Southern pulp and 
paper industry during the 1930s and 1950s had been pioneered primarily by a narrow 
group of Northeast and Mid-West firms.  In contrast, the Pacific market was walled off 
behind the Rocky Mountains and increased freight rates.  It was dominated by firms of 
local origin.  The only notable exception was Longview Fiber, which had been 
established by Wisconsin papermakers and later acquired by the largest pulp and paper 
firm in the world, International Paper Company, based on the East Coast.19 
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC suggested that leading Pacific firms had 
outgrown their original markets, and their managers should look for growth in other 
regions and products.  Crown Zellerbach began a move eastwards and entered the 
corrugated paper industry by acquiring Wisconsin-based Gaylord in 1955.  Another 
                                                 
18 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission. 
19 Hannes Toivanen, Learning and Corporate Strategy: The Dynamic Evolution of the North American 
Pulp and Paper Industry, 1860-1970, Ch. 5, See also: John A. Stanturf, Robert C. Kellison, F.C. 
Broerman, and Stephen B. Jones, “Innovation and Forests Industry: Domesticating the Pine Forests of 
the Southern United States, 1920-1999”. Forest Policy and Economics Vol. 5, Nr. 4 (Dec 2003), 407-
410; William Boyd, “The Forest is the Future? Industrial Forestry and the Southern Pulp and Paper 
Industry Complex,” In: Philip Scranton (ed), The Second Wave. Southern Industrialization from the 
1940s to the 1970s. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2001, 168-218. Illustrative of the regional 
organization of pulp and paper industry during in the 1950s is: Smith, History of Papermaking in the 
United States, 531-571.  
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Pacific forests industry giant, Weyerhaeuser Corporation, made an identical move by 
acquiring a Wisconsin paper container firm, Kieckhefer-Eddy, in 1957.  Crown-
Zellerbach and Weyerhaeuser had little prior experience in the paper container industry 
and no production in the East.  Within a decade, both firms ranked among the leading 
U.S. container producers and had extensive operations in the Mid-West and South.20 
International Paper, in contrast, began a move towards the West in 1956, when 
it acquired the West Coast located Long-Bell Lumber Corporation and Long-Bell 
Lumber Company, which together controlled substantial timber lands in Oregon and 
Washington.  Even before the acquisition, International Paper towered over other 
North American forests products firms with its 21 million acres of forest land and 
paper production capacity three times that of the next largest firm, Crown-Zellerbach.  
The FTC viewed the acquisition in light of IP’s announced plans to build a new West 
Coast mill, and set strict conditions for merger approval.21 
In response to the FTC challenge, International Paper agreed to divest all of its 
other West Coast assets, namely the earlier acquired Longview Fiber, and refrain from 
acquiring any competitors for the next ten years.  It also conceded to “sell at least 40 
percent of its proposed West Coast mill to independent, non-integrated wholesalers, 
converters, and other purchasers located in Western states.”  Although the FTC order 
permitted IP’s entry into the West, it also significantly restricted the firm’s strategy in 
other segments of the pulp and paper industry.  In his insightful history of the 
corrugated paper industry, Grover Daly has pointed out that antitrust action restricted 
                                                 
20 Smith, History of Papermaking, 531-571. 
21 Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1957. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1957, 33-34; Federal Trade Commission, Docket 6676. 
International Paper Company (1957). 
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International Paper from acquiring firms, whereas all other firms participated in 
“merger orgy [sic]” during the 1950’s.22 
Government antimerger cases against the two largest U.S. pulp and paper firms 
suggest that antitrust policy facilitated geographical and product diversification of 
large-scale forest products enterprises.  The competitive environment favored a growth 
strategy through which firms entered new regions, rather than expanding their presence 
in their home regions.  St. Regis Paper Company exemplified this point perhaps better 
than any other U.S. firm.  The Northeast-based company increased its annual sales 
from about $50 million in 1945 to almost $540 million by 1960, without objection 
from the FTC.  St. Regis aggressively acquired firms in order to enter the South and 
Pacific markets and to supplement and diversify its product portfolio, which had been 
dominated by newsprint.23 
Antimerger cases against Scott, Crown Zellerbach, and International Paper 
established a rather well articulated policy framework that guided merger and 
acquisition policies of  U.S. pulp and paper firms in terms of geography and product 
focus.  Yet the decisions left large tracts of the competitive landscape without clear 
standards against which managers could weigh the legality of potential acquisitions 
and mergers.  Beginning in the late 1950s, antimerger enforcement activity by 
government in pulp and paper concentrated on forging industry-specific standards for 
each market segment.  
 
                                                 
22 Grover J. Daly, The Corrugated Container Industry – A history and Analysis. Chicago: Board 
Products Publishing Company 1971, 74-75.; Annual Report 1957. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office 1957, 33-34; Federal Trade Commission, Docket 6676. International Paper Company 
(1957). 
23 The company expansion is detailed in: Eleanor Amigo and Mark Neuffer, Beyond The Adirondacks. 
The Story of St. Regis Paper Company. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press 1980, 93-120. 
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Industry specific standards of the Celler-Kefauver Act 
Regional and product specialization were the two fundamental foci of antitrust 
enforcement in pulp and paper under the Celler-Kefauver Act.  Such enforcement 
policy centered on individual product or process segments of the entire pulp and paper 
industry.  Rarely if ever did they consider competitive structure in the forest products 
industry as a whole.  Perhaps no other case demonstrated this as clearly as U.S. v. 
Kimberly-Clark. 
Launched by government in 1962 when Kimberly-Clark Corporation attempted 
to acquire a large paper merchant house that supplied the major Pacific markets, the 
case eventually resulted in a significant clarification of  the circumstances under which 
courts would declare mergers in the pulp and paper industry illegal under the Celler-
Kefauver Act.  For the first time since Congress had amended the Clayton Act in 1950, 
the industry could operate under definitive quantitative or qualitative tests through 
which all parties could gauge the likely legality of a given merger.24 
Government antimerger intervention came on the heels of an exhaustive 
expansion and diversification program by Kimberly-Clark.  The growth strategy had 
recast the traditional Wisconsin manufacturer of fine and sanitary paper as a national 
multi-product forest products firm.  This transformation complicated application of 
Celler-Kefauver Act, because the Act was designed to stymie concentration within 
specified regions or product segments.  Government proceedings in the case 
functioned as something like a collective exercise in standard-setting, whereby 
officials, courts, and the industry learned how antimerger statutes actually worked in 
the context of the U.S. pulp and paper industry during a period in which all the leading 
firms were adopting a similar national, multi-product structure. 
                                                 
24 United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 264 F. Supp. 439 (1967)  
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Kimberly-Clark had adopted mergers and acquisitions as the primary vehicle of 
an aggressive expansion strategy during the 1950s, and the company quickly entered 
new regional markets and lines of business.  It acquired two smaller Mid-West paper 
companies in 1951 and 1956, and after absorbing the International Cellucotton 
Products Company in 1951, it re-organized its key intellectual property rights, 
production facilities, and distribution outlets connected with sanitary products.  In 
1957, Kimberly-Clark entered tobacco fine papers through the acquisition of a leading 
manufacturer, and two further large acquisitions marked its entry into the envelope 
paper industry in 1959 and 1961.25 
Strategic acquisitions of regional or product-specialized firms punctuated the 
expansion of Kimberly-Clark, and, indeed, all leading pulp and paper firms. 
Acquisition of firms was the major method by which managers attempted to enter new 
regions or product lines.  In so doing, managers carefully tried to walk the line 
between illegal and legal merger activity, but this line was vaguely construed before 
courts handed down segment-specific benchmark decisions in the early 1960s.  When 
Kimberly-Clark managers decided to enter the Pacific markets in the late 1950s, they 
prompted a lengthy legal process that defined such standards. 
In 1956, Kimberly-Clark constructed a new mill and converting plant in 
Fullerton, California that produced sanitary paper products.  It also acquired large 
virgin West Coast pulpwood tracts from the Ralph L. Smith Lumber Company in 1961 
and announced that it would build a fully integrated pulp and printing paper mill at 
Anderson, California.  Also in 1961, attempting to complete its entry into Western 
markets, Kimberly-Clark acquired Blake, Moffit, and Towne (hereafter BMT), the 
largest Western merchant house, with 34 outlets in six Western states and over $65 
                                                 
25 United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation. 
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million annual sales in 1960.  Antitrust officials of the Department of Justice 
challenged the forward merger 1962, a move eventually upheld by courts in 1967.26 
A central reason why antitrust officials took issue with Kimberly-Clark was its 
ranking as the fourth largest U.S. pulp and paper firm, one that sold practically all 
kinds of papers.  The company had about a 7.5% share of the U.S. fine and printing 
paper markets, and totaled half a billion dollar annual sales volume in 1962.  
Moreover, Kimberly-Clark controlled lucrative niche markets in sanitary paper 
products (Table 3.).  On these grounds, government alleged that acquisition of BMT by 
Kimberly-Clark was injurious to competition in the Western market and nationally in 
the “printing and fine paper, sanitary paper products, coarse paper and paper products 
combined.”27 
 
Table 3. Kimberly-Clark share of and the total annual value of selected 
U.S. paper markets in 1958. 
Grade Percent share Total value of the market 
(million) 
Facial tissues 59.96% 
Sanitary napkins 52.65% 
Sanitary products 24.00% $192 
Thin paper 16.06% 
Printing and fine papers   7.50% 
Source: United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 264 F. Supp. 439 
(1967). 
 
Although Kimberly-Clark held the largest market shares in sanitary paper 
products, government pursued its case in the context of the fine and printing paper 
industry.  The Department of Justice argued that Kimberly-Clark’s acquisitions 
increased the momentum towards industry concentration in this segment, and 
maintained that the Celler-Kefauver Act was legislated by the Congress to arrest a 
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27 United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation. 
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trend of industry concentration before it caught momentum.  Government cited recent 
Supreme Court decisions that had defined the meaning of the Celler-Kefauver Act: “to 
preserve competition among many small businesses by arresting a trend toward 
concentration in its incipiency before the trend developed to the point that a market 
was left in the grip of a few big companies.”28 
Government documented how fine and printing paper firms had acquired in 
total some 33 independent paper merchant houses between 1956 and 1966.  Five firms-
- Mead, Champion, Kimberly-Clark, Hammermill, and Nekoosa-Edwards-- accounted 
for 25 of these acquisitions.  These firms specialized in the rapidly expanding office 
copy paper market that consisted to a large degree of small businesses and consumers, 
who government believed were best supplied through specialized paper distribution 
networks.29 
 
Table 4. The rank and share of the 20 leading U.S. manufacturers of fine 
and printing paper in 1967. 
Company  Total tonnage Share of industry Cumulate share of  
1. International 700,635 8.11% 
2. Mead 545,941 6.33% 14.44% 
3. Champion 536,891 6.22% 20.66% 
4. Kimberly-Clark 456,172 5.28% 25.94% 
5. West-Virginia 436,042 5.05% 30.99% 
6. Hammermill 430,095 4.98% 35.97% 
7. St. Regis 362,330 4.11% 40.19% 
8. Oxford 352,597 4.08% 44.27% 
9. Consolidated 342,398 3.96%* 48.23% 
10. Crown Zellerbach 286,243 3.31%* 51.54% 
11. Boise Cascade 231,095 3.68% 54.22% 
12. Weyerhaeuser 215,024 2.49% 56.71% 
13. Northwest 214,824 2.49% 59.50% 
14. Nekoosa Edwards 198,217 2.30% 61.50% 
                                                 
28 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277 (1966). For the definition meaning of 
“industry trend” in the context of Celler Kefauver Act, see also: Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. 294, 317-318 (1962). 
29 The acquisitions are listed in: Unites States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271 (1977). 
* As in original. 
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15. S.D. Warren 176,346 2.00% 63.50% 
16. Blandin 175,383 1.98% 65.48% 
17. Fraser 170,130 1.97% 67.45% 
18. Glatfelter 136,147 1.58% 69.03% 
19. New York & Penn 113,796 1.33% 70.36% 
20. Union Camp 113,714 1.32% 71.68% 
Source: Unites States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271 (1977). 
 
Concentration and forward integration in the fine and printing industry was 
evident, but government and industry disagreed about how to interpret the trend.  Fine 
and printing paper firms claimed that forward integration into marketing and 
distribution was a condition of survival, and was dictated by change in demand 
structure.  Such phenomena as the diffusion of office copy equipment changed the way 
people and organizations consumed paper, the firms argued, and they must adapt to 
this.  Government argued that acquisition of marketing arms by leading fine and 
printing paper firms created a “chain reaction effect” in the industry, and “clearly, 
there is substantial self-perpetuating trend in the paper industry of paper merchant 
acquisitions by paper mills.  Kimberly-Clark was a participant in the trend.”30 
U.S. v. Kimberly-Clark centered on the issue of under what circumstances such 
forward integration could be ruled illegal.  After extensive acquisitions, the five largest 
manufacturers of fine and printing paper controlled merchant houses with combined 
sales about $441 million in 1963, roughly 12 per cent of the total annual paper 
merchant sales.  Industry statistics did not support claims of growing concentration in 
the fine and printing paper industry, however, and instead documented a rather steady 
industry structure.  Between 1961 and 1971, the four largest paper firms held a steady 
market share of about 27 percent, while the top eight firms held a 44 percent share 
throughout the period.  Managers of the paper firms argued that government did not 
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understand industry dynamics.  Without acquisitions, managers reasoned, the leading 
firms would have lost their market share, and long-term competitive advantages.31 
Kimberly-Clark’s recent experience illustrated the managers’ point.  In 1960, 
the company had lost a bidding contest for Carpenter Paper Company to Champion 
Paper.  When Kimberly-Clark’s Western sales manager, H.P. Westler, subsequently 
learned that an investment bank had recommended that BMT merge with a larger 
paper manufacturer, he warned top management of problems if the merchant house 
were acquired by a competitor.  The trend toward vertical integration was pronounced 
in the Western markets, where the four leading paper merchants were controlled by 
pulp and paper firms. 32 
Details of the changing competitive environment and merger wave, however, 
played in hands of the government.  Statutes and court interpretations under the Celler-
Kefauver Act did not consider the reasons motivating vertical mergers, such as the 
protection of existing distribution channels or the defensive acquisition of distribution 
to protect manufacturing capabilities, but instead focused exclusively on the effects of 
mergers upon industry-wide competitive structure.  The seminal case of U.S. v. E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours, for instance, had established that if a company acquired power to 
control significant channels of distribution, it violated the Celler-Kefauver Act 
“whether or not actual restraints, or the substantial lessening of competition, have 
occurred or are intended.”33  In U.S. v. Pennzoil Co., the courts had established that 
                                                 
31 Unites States v. Hammermill Paper Company, 429 F. Supp. 1271 (1977). 
32 Zellerbach had been controlled by Crown Zellerbach for many years, whereas Carpenter Paper 
Company, Butler Paper Company, and BMT had been acquired by Champion, Nekoosa-Edwards, and 
K-C, respectively. The Noland paper Company in Los Angeles had been acquired by Mead, and Potlash 
Forests had acquired the Wilson-Rich Papers Company in San Francisco, Columbia Paper Company that 
operated in Los Angeles and San Diego, and the Grand Canyon Paper Company of Phoenix. United 
States v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation. 
33 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586, 589. 
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“the government’s burden is not to show that competition will be lessened by the 
acquisition, but only that it may tend to be lessened.”34 
Kimberly-Clark’s post-merger behavior did little to allay the fears of 
government officials or its competitors.  Between 1961 and 1963, Kimberly-Clark 
sales through BMT increased from $1.4 million to almost $3.8 million.  The merchant 
house was integrated tightly into its new parent, and it was made into major 
distribution network for Kimberly-Clark papers.  BMT began to carry several new 
types and grades of Kimberly-Clark papers, such as envelopes and sanitary paper 
products, which it had not represented previously.  Competing firms saw their sales 
through BMT decline rapidly.  A representative of Consolidated Papers told the court 
that his sales shrank from one million dollars in 1961 to $300,000 by 1964.35  
When the court declared Kimberly-Clark’s acquisition of BMT illegal under 
the revised Section 7 of the Clayton Act, it emphasized “(1) the nature and purpose of 
the acquisition, (2) the post-acquisition behavior on the market, and (3) the definite 
trend toward integration in which K-C was a deliberate and significant participant.”36 
The decision represented the most thorough review of the conditions under which 
paper firms could integrate forward into distribution and established clear guidelines 
for future judicial interpretations.  “Unless this acquisition is undone,” the court 
concluded, “Kimberly-Clark and its competitors will have a green light to proceed 
with further acquisitions.”37 
                                                 
34 United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 92, 971 (W.D. 1965). Enforcement of the Celler-Kefauver 
Act relied often on the fact that the Act defined potential injury to competition as a violation, and did not 
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v. Consolidated Foods, 380 U.S. 592, 599, 14 L. Ed 2d 95, 85 S. Ct. 1220 (1965): “If reciprocal buying 
creates for Gentry a protected market, which others cannot penetrate despite of superiority of price, 
quality, or service, competition is lessened whether or not Gentry can expand its market share.” 
35 United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation. 
36 United States v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation. 
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While United States v. Kimberly-Clark was the single most important case to 
forge segment-specific standards for pulp and paper under the Celler-Kefauver Act, it 
was not a unique case.  Because the expansion and diversification strategy of all 
leading pulp and paper firms was punctuated by mergers and acquisitions, many other 
firms tiptoed around similar legal issues as Kimberly-Clark.  Indeed, several identical 
cases against fine and printing paper firms were pending even as the Kimberly-Clark 
case reached its conclusion. 
In 1966, the court established antimerger standards in a case against the fifth 
largest U.S. paper company, West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company (hereafter 
Westvaco).  Westvaco had followed a program of regional expansion and product 
diversification parallel to that of Kimberly-Clark.  The exhaustive merger and 
acquisition policy had transformed the East Coast company, which had traditionally 
produced bleached and unbleached kraft papers and boards and fine and printing 
papers, into a national, multi-product paper firm.  The most notable of Westvaco’s 
acquisitions occurred in 1953, when it absorbed Hinde & Dauch Paper Company, then 
the world’s largest producer of corrugated paper products.  Smaller but similar 
acquisitions followed, and Westvaco’s annual sales increased from $95.5 million in 
1950 to $233 million in 1959.38 
In 1960, company’s exhaustive acquisition policy was stymied when antitrust 
officials challenged its merger with the United States Envelope Company, which 
dominated one quarter of a market for envelopes valued at $250 million annually. An 
eventual court order restrained Westvaco from supplying any paper to its new 
envelope division, thereby eliminating the benefits of vertical merger.  Prior to the 
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merger, the court observed, U.S. Envelope had purchased paper for its converting 
operations from some fifty different paper firms.39 
The experiences of Westvaco and Kimberly-Clark illustrate how the Celler-
Kefauver Act came to constrain the ability of large pulp and paper firms to diversify 
across product categories and extend their geographical scope.  The rulings against the 
firms were based on perceived injury to competition that occurred when a large pulp 
and paper enterprise acquired a smaller regional or specialized paper converting firm. 
Westvaco and Kimberly-Clark possessed advantageous economies of scale in the 
production of pulp and paper, and sought to feed their enormous production through 
the acquired firms.  Such vertical integration removed or diminished a market 
composed of suppliers of paper.  The Westvaco and Kimberly-Clark cases clearly 
informed the industry that the Department of Justice would look dimly upon such 
developments. 
Such rigid antimerger standards constrained the ability of pulp and paper 
managers to respond to dynamic forces of industrial change, such as technological 
innovation, change in demand structure, and the heightened importance of distribution 
networks.  Following the Kimberly-Clark ruling, antitrust enforcement in the pulp and 
paper industry acquired a highly segment-specific character, further demonstrating the 
centrality of the case. 
 
Antimerger policy in the fine and printing paper industry, 1967-1977 
Landmark, segment-specific cases during the 1950s and 1960s, while limited in 
number, solidified the institutional incentive structures that operated upon all pulp and 
paper firms.  As one of the fastest growing industry segments, the fine and printing 
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paper segment inevitably felt the effects.  Resolution of the Kimberly-Clark case 
prompted Champion Papers and Mead Corporation to settle pending antimerger cases 
that challenged their acquisition of large marketing arms in this branch of the trade.  
The defendants in U.S v. Champion and U.S. v. Mead accepted consent decrees in 
1968 and 1970, respectively.  Champion agreed to partially divest its acquired fine and 
printing paper merchant houses and to reduce the annual sales volume of its marketing 
arms from $150 million to $100 million.  For its part, Mead agreed to reduce its 
control of acquired fine and printing paper merchant houses from their combined 
annual sales volume of $180 million to roughly $110 million.  Champion and Mead 
were permitted to retain some control of their Western and Mid-Western merchant 
houses because they demonstrated a need to protect distribution within established 
markets.  This concession by government constituted an important fine-tuning of 
policy that exerted significant influence upon subsequent antimerger cases involving 
fine and printing paper.40  
Together, the Kimberly-Clark, Mead, and Champion antimerger cases defined 
the political economy and competitive structure for the industry.  The only subsequent 
case of note to depart from the doctrines established in these cases occurred in 1977, 
when Pennsylvania Hammermill successfully challenged a Department of Justice order 
to divest itself of merchant houses it had acquired years before.41  Hammermill, the 
sixth largest U.S. fine and print paper firm, had acquired Western Newspaper 
Association in 1961 and Carter Rice Storrs and Bement, Inc. five years later.  These 
merchant houses had combined annual sales volume of approximately $100 million in 
the South, Mid-West, Middle-Atlantic, and New England.  Hammermill argued that 
the Mead and Champion consent degrees established the extent a paper firm could 
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41 Unites States v. Hammermill Paper Co. 
 24
control captive markets.  In addition, the company countered monopoly allegations of 
government by demonstrating that it had not fully integrated the merchant houses but 
instead operated them credibly as independent firms.42 
The post-merger behavior of Hammermill constituted an important factor in the 
case.  Government alleged that Hammermill’s move would foreclose competition 
among fine and printing paper firms.  The court concluded that the likelihood of 
foreclosure was diminished by low barriers of entry into the paper merchant house 
business.  Between 1963 and 1967, the number of merchant outlets had in fact 
increased from 882 to 933.  Hammermill, moreover, accounted for just five percent of 
annual national sales of fine and printing paper, its most important line of business.43 
Hammermill’s ability to integrate forward depended also on the fact that sales through 
paper merchants had actually declined significantly.  At the end of  World War II, 
nearly 60 percent of total paper sales were carried through merchant houses.  By 1972, 
following a six-year burst during which three fine and print paper mills acquired six 
paper merchant houses, this share had declined to 40 percent.  Thus, competition in the 
market for fine papers would persist even if Hammermill had a significant presence 
among merchants. 
While the courts ruled in favor of Hammermill, the case hardly signaled a 
dramatic departure from established constraints on vertical integration.  Hammermill’s 
acquisition of its marketing arms fell somewhere between a true forward integration 
and a simple sales contract.  Its carefully crafted agreements exemplified how 
managers carefully designed strategic acquisitions in the context of political economy 
and were prepared to walk the fine line of antimerger policy.  Even if Hammermill did 
prove successful in its efforts to defend its acquisitions of merchant houses, moreover, 
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government had extracted a price.  It issued a consent order that prohibited the 
company from maintaining resale prices or imposing customer restrictions on its 
dealers.44 
By the time the Hammermill case reached this outcome, concerns about 
mergers no longer dominated the paper industry.  During the decade between U.S. v. 
Kimberly-Clark and U.S. v. Hammermill Paper, the competitive structure of the fine 
and printing paper industry had undergone thorough transformation.  New departures 
in corporate strategy and a shift in the focus of antitrust enforcement signaled the 
change.  Perhaps most illuminating of the new conditions was the announcement of 
Kimberly-Clark in 1976 that it would exit the fine and printing paper industry because 
of deplorable conditions in the trade.  Although firms continued to disappear in the 
industry through mergers and acquisitions, such episodes seldom raised alarms about 
market concentration or prompted legal challenges.  Instead, during the 1970s the 
industry was increasingly suspected, and in some cases found guilty, of unfair trade 
practices and price fixing.  
 
Cartels and trade practice cases in the fine and printing paper industry 
Since passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act, government had consistently aimed 
its antitrust enforcement at arresting concentration and sustaining competitive markets. 
During the 1970s, this sustained antimerger policy intervention in the fine and printing 
paper industry was followed by a wave of cartel and unfair trade allegations.  A new 
spate of antitrust cases suggested that fine and printing firms could potentially 
circumvent earlier antitrust policy through coercive business practices, mainly tying 
practices.  The declining importance of antimerger policy and increasing role of cartel 
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allegations highlighted the changing competitive structure of the fine and printing 
paper industry.   
In Unijax Inc. v. Champion International, a Southeastern paper merchant firm 
alleged that Champion had attempted to coerce it from carrying the papers of 
Champion’s competitors.  Although the court held the allegations unfounded after a 
successful appeal by Champion, the case hinted at widespread foreclosure and tying 
practices.45   In 1978, the Department of Justice charged sixteen firms that controlled 
almost 60 percent of the fine paper market with violation of antitrust laws.  
Government alleged a “nationwide horizontal conspiracy at the mill level to fix the 
price of fine paper and [sic] to eliminate inter- and intra-brand competition among 
their wholesaler customers.”46  Evidence detailed price fixing and other illegal tactics 
intended to reduce competition in the industry between 1965 and 1977.47 
Although grounded in allegations of price fixing and unfair trade practices, In 
Re “Fine Paper” Antitrust Litigation was a direct continuation of government’s earlier 
antimerger efforts in the fine and printing paper industry.  Government alleged that 
defendants had employed “threats and other concerted actions against merchant houses 
to secure adherence to an aggregation of trade restraints designed to minimize price 
discounting and otherwise minimize intrabrand competition between mill owned and 
independent merchant houses.”48  The charges suggested that leading fine and printing 
paper firms had continued to pursue forward integration into distribution even after 
unfavorable rulings in U.S. v. Kimberly-Clark and similar cases.  Government alleged 
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that paper firms fixed the prices at which merchant houses sold paper, and that non-
conforming merchant houses were systemically eliminated as competitors.49 
“Fine Paper” Antitrust developed into a vast case through which private 
parties sought damages from the defendants totaling in excess of 100 000 ???, 
according to one method of calculation.  Most states were included, as were a great 
number of school districts that obtained their paper from the defendants.  The case 
generated legions of bad publicity for the paper industry, and some of the leading 
firms, St. Regis Paper Company, International Paper Company, Potlach Corporation, 
Union Camp Corporation, Weyerhaeuser Company, and Boise Cascade Corporation, 
decided to settle.  These companies alone accounted for some 38 per cent of U.S. fine 
paper sales and comprised damage claims totaling nearly $30 million.  Eventually 
most other defendants settled the case as well, with the last company to do so being 
Champion Paper, which reached agreement during the first day of trial on September 
22, 1980.  The settlements totaled, including legal costs, almost $51 million.50 
The price-fixing case solidified the competitive environment of the fine and 
printing paper industry.  The most notable subsequent antitrust case in the industry was 
a minor one from 1982 in which Hammermill attempted to relax modestly the 1977 
consent order.  Hammermill claimed it had been unable to penetrate the fast-growing 
market for small copier paper composed of small customers, and asked for permission 
to impose customer restrictions on its dealers.  The move, reasoned the company, 
would increase competition at the industry level.  The FTC allowed the company to 
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impose customer restrictions on its dealers as long as doing so would not unreasonably 
restrain competition.51 
The antitrust experience of the fine and printing paper industry between 1950 
and 1990 offers an example of the extent to which government policy shaped the 
competitive structure of particular segments of the pulp and paper industry.  Industry’s 
rapid forward integration into distribution was stymied by rigid government standards 
established in U.S. v. Kimberly-Clark.  The essential structure of the industry remained 
relatively stable in the wake of  this seminal 1967 case.  Though it is beyond the scope 
of this article to establish definitively whether such stability resulted from antimerger 
intervention or as a result of competitive forces, it is noteworthy that collusion was 
indisputably an important element in what even a casual observer must have 
recognized as an elusive pursuit of industrial stability.  The sequence of antitrust 
enforcement in the industry suggests that managers continued to struggle with dynamic 
forces of industrial change.  From the vantage point of theory, it is plausible to argue 
that under such circumstances managers were inclined to resort to collusion when 
political economy prohibited alternative organizational arrangements, most notably by 
restraining merger activity. 
 
Antitrust in the paper container industry, 1950-1970 
The antitrust experience of the fine paper sector between 1950 and 1990 was 
not unique to that segment of the paper industry.  Perhaps the most notable analogy 
was offered by the paper container industry. 
Rivalry between incumbent leaders and new entrants characterized the 
dynamics of the paper container industry following World War II.  Producers of 
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folding and corrugated paper cartons had experienced annual growth in demand of 
approximately 12% during the war mobilization years, and growth continued at a 5% 
annual rate through the 1950s.  These growth rates made the supply of paperboard 
from mills to paper converting factories an increasingly important issue, and, in part, 
prompted a merger wave after the World War II demobilization.52 
Concentration was most evident in the corrugated paper container industry, 
where thirteen combinations during the 1950’s reduced over fifty leading specialized 
corrugated paper container firms to fifteen national, vertically integrated companies.  
Vertical integration characterized seven of these mergers.  Another four involved 
horizontal mergers among converters, and in two cases a manufacturer of metal and 
glass containers diversified into paper containers.  The resultant fifteen industry 
leaders dominated U.S. markets, with annual sales of $2.7 billion.  These firms had 
similar organizational capabilities and overlapping geographical operations.53 
Despite the number of mergers in the paper container sector during the 1950s, 
antitrust officials intervened with only one, Union Bag & Paper Corporation’s 
acquisition of the Hankins Container Company.  In 1955, the FTC included this 
horizontal combination among its most important merger cases, arguing that the 
resulting conglomerate monopolized production, sale, and distribution of container 
board east of the Mississippi.54  
Though perhaps the world’s largest specialized paper container firm, Union 
Bag operated only one large vertically integrated pulp, paper, and converting mill, 
located in Savannah, Georgia.  Consequently, it had trouble meeting the increasing 
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demand for paper containers.  Major competitors, such as Mead Corporation, 
Container Corporation, International Paper, and Hinde and Dauch Paper Company, 
expanded their nationwide market presence.  Each emphasized mergers that secured 
material supply within their firms.  Union’s chief competitor, Hinde and Dauch, 
merged with West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company in 1953.  The vertical merger 
marked the entry of West Virginia into the paper container industry and solved Hinde 
and Dauch’s difficulties in securing linerboard supply for its converting operations.55 
Concerns over paper supply prompted Union Bag to invest over $50 million 
between 1951 and 1955 to increase daily capacity of its Savanna mill production 
capacity to 1,800 tons of paper and board.  By 1956, daily output topped 2,000 tons.  
In a continued effort to secure paper supply for converting plants, that same year 
Union acquired Camp Manufacturing Company, a fully integrated producer of 
bleached and unbleached sulphate pulp, paper, and board.  Union Bag-Camp Paper 
Company planned to increase Camp’s Savannah mill production capacity from 375 
daily tons to 600 by 1959.  Following that merger, Union-Camp also acquired five 
additional firms in different segments of the paper industry.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the FTC opened an antimerger investigation in 1960.56 
The Union-Camp investigation was part of a larger FTC effort to maintain 
competitive structure in the paper container industry and to arrest unfolding trends 
toward market concentration and vertical integration.  In 1956, the commission had 
opened an investigation into whether St. Regis Paper Company’s aggressive 
acquisition strategy had substantially reduced competition in corrugated paper 
containers.  St. Regis had become one of the leading U.S. pulp and paper firms.  In 
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1963, the FTC concluded that St. Regis was responsible for rapid horizontal 
concentration in the corrugated container industry and ordered it to divest seven of the 
corrugated container firms it had acquired.  In addition, the FTC stipulated that during 
the next ten years the company needed prior FTC approval for acquisition of any 
company engaged in paperboard or paper container production.57 
FTC intervention also influenced other firms seeking a piece of the booming 
container business.  Industry giant International Paper Company, long shadowed by 
antitrust concerns, shunned acquisitions and instead built new container plants.  Other 
policy interventions were more visible.  In 1965, the FTC issued final orders of 
divestiture in proceedings challenging acquisitions of producers of corrugated 
containers by Mead, Union Bag-Camp Paper, and Inland Container Corporation.  
Inland accepted a consent degree in 1966, as did all the firms eventually, and 
proceeded with divestitures.58 
Government’s antimerger intervention in the paper container industry between 
1950 and 1970 echoed industry dynamics and policy goals familiar from the fine and 
printing paper industry.  Large-scale pulp and paper enterprises attempted to integrate 
forward into paper container operations, while government intended to maintain 
competitive markets between paper suppliers and container converters.  Duplicating 
the sequence of antitrust enforcement in the fine and printing paper industry, this 
sustained antimerger intervention in the paper container industry was followed by 
extensive price fixing allegations in the 1970’s. 
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This aspect of the container industry’s dynamics first came to light in 1967, 
when the Justice Department charged corrugated paper manufacturers in the Southeast 
with price fixing.  The national industry concentrated in the Southeast, where  
production of paper board had increased from 9 billion square feet in 1955 to almost 
16 billion by 1963.  In 1955, 30 firms operated 49 plants producing identical product 
in the Southeast.  In 1963, 51 firms operated 98 plants.  Despite the proliferation of 
firms and facilities, however, output had grown increasingly concentrated.  The 16 
firms charged with antitrust violations accounted for over 90 % of productive capacity.  
The six largest firms accounted for over 60% of the total.  Eight of the defendants had 
entered the corrugated paper industry in the Southeast between 1956 and 1959.59 
Lower courts dismissed allegations of violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, but Assistant Attorney General Edwin Zimmerman managed to obtain a guilty 
verdict from the Supreme Court in 1969.  The decision strictly prohibited any sharing 
of price information between the defendants and required them to provide access 
necessary for government to monitor compliance.60 
For a while, the industry appeared to have stabilized, until a flurry of antitrust 
charges beginning in 1976 revealed a highly contentious industry.  That year alone, 
more than fifty civil antitrust suits were filed after the Justice Department indicted 23 
folding carton firms and 47 individuals for violation of antitrust laws.  Plaintiffs 
included over 35,000 purchasers of folding cartons who alleged nationwide price 
fixing between 1960 and 1974.  Defendants included the leading U.S. pulp and paper 
firms, such as Container Corporation, St. Regis, Mead, International Paper, Champion, 
Westvaco, Weyerhaeuser, Georgia Pacific, and Union Camp. The case was settled for 
approximately $200 million, a record settlement in the history of U.S. antitrust at that 
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time.  Evidence presented in the case helped government to win another industry wide 
price fixing case, U.S. v. Alton Box Board Co. et al, in 1979. Together, these cases 
imposed costly fines and settlements on the industry.  In addition, courts ordered the 
firms to comply with strict competitive rules, such as a 25-year prohibition from 
refraining to submit a bid for any sale of folding cartons and other detailed prohibitions 
of collusive trade practices.61 
These cases centered on allegations of price fixing and trade practices, but they 
addressed powerful dynamics of vertical and horizontal integration.  The original count 
against folding carton firms alleged that vertically integrated folding carton firms 
restricted supply of paperboard to independent folding carton plants.  Though this was 
dropped from the complaint,62 similar allegations surfaced in 1978, when Franklin 
Container Corporation et al v. International Paper Company et al alleged that 
vertically integrated corrugated box firms attempted to wipe out independent firms by 
maintaining artificially low prices in boxes.63  The plaintiffs detailed five acts of 
conspiratorial activity that revolved around the competitive structure of the corrugated 
paper container industry: one, the acquisition of independent corrugated box 
manufacturers and construction of box plant by paperboard manufacturers; two, 
vertically integrated corrugated firms charged more for paperboard when selling to 
independent box makers than when transferring material within the firm; three, “fixing 
the price of corrugated boxes at artificially low levels;” four, “reciprocal arrangements 
among the defendants, such as exchange of kraft liner board throughout the U.S. 
without regard to differences in cost of production and without charge of freight, 
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handling, or other necessary costs;” and five, production of misleading industry and 
price statistics with the intention to distort prices.  
 The court dismissed the allegations of Franklin Container v. International 
Paper, but the vertically integrated corrugated container firms became target of yet 
another antitrust case in 1978.64  Consumers of corrugated boxes filed antitrust suit 
alleging conspiracy aimed at maintaining artificially high prices, and demanded triple 
damages under the law.  The case involved more than 200,000 plaintiffs according to 
one estimate. Government also joined the plaintiffs, and alleged price fixing between 
1960 and 1975.65 
The case illustrated the powerful role played by large-scale pulp and paper 
enterprises in restructuring the organization of the industry.  Defendants accounted for 
only 5% of the some 800 firms manufacturing corrugated containers in the U.S, yet 
they generated some 72% of the annual dollar volume of sales.  The majority of 
plaintiffs were likewise major pulp and paper companies owning several corrugated 
plants throughout the U.S.  As the case proceeded and again generated bad publicity, 
defendants agreed to settle the charges.  Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation 
again broke the record for highest dollar value antitrust settlement in U.S. history, 
eventually reaching approximately $550 million.66 
The Corrugated Container Antitrust case revealed that large pulp and paper 
enterprises performed differently than the rest of the industry.  Although the number of 
corrugated paper firms had increased steadily between 1960 and 1975 (see Table 5 and 
Table 6), the leading firms had been able to increase their market share during the 
1970s.  Vertical integration between large-scale pulp and paper firms and paper 
                                                 
64 Franklin Container Corporation et al v. International Paper Company et al. (1978). 
65 Alonzo Thomas Dill, Chesapeake. Pioneer Papermaker. A History of the Company and Its 
Communities. West Point, VA: Chesapeake Corporation 1987, 310-312. 
66 In re: Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation 80 F.R.D. 244 (1978); In re: Corrugated Container 
Antitrust Litigation (CCH) P64, 114 (1981); Dill, Chesapeake, 312. 
 35
container converters mirrored the dynamics between fine and printing paper firms and 
merchant houses.  It proved relatively easy for capital-intensive, large-scale producers 
to integrate forward and thereby gain control of markets, whereas the contrary – 
backward integration -- was an unknown phenomenon in the industry. 
 
Table 5. Number of U.S. Corrugated paper firms 
Year Firms 
1960 425 
1965 524 
1970 679 
1975 759 
Source: In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation (CCH) P64, 114 
(1982).  
 
These internal dynamics of industrial change became visible when government 
challenged in 1980 the acquisition of Menasha Corporation by Weyerhaeuser 
Company.  Weyerhaeuser’s annual sales reached $4.5 billion in 1979.I  It was the 
largest U.S. producer of shipping containers, which totaled some 12% of its sales.  
Menasha was primarily a shipping container firm, with large market presence in the 
Mid-West and West.  In the Pacific market, Menasha was the third largest producer of 
corrugated paper board, while Weyerhaeuser ranked seventh.  The FTC estimated that 
the merger would “significantly increase already high levels of concentration in the 
West, where four-firm concentration would increase from 53.27 percent to 60.71 and 
eight-firm concentration from 85.39 to 91.32.”67 
 
Table 6. Selected firms share of U.S. Corrugated paper products markets 
in 1970 and 1977. 
Firm 1970 1977 
Container Corporation 6.15 6.19 
Weyerhaeuser 5.60 5.85 
International Paper 5.30 5.93 
Inland Container Corporation 5.05 5.56 
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St. Regis 3.22 2.48 
Willamette 2.71 3.29 
Longview Fibre 1.66 1.94 
Stone 1.65 2.10 
Union Camp 1.65 2.35 
Menasha 0.99 1.33 
Source: In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation (CCH) P64, 114 
(1982). 
 
A central aim of the FTC was to prevent vertically integrated firms from 
gaining too much market power in the U.S. shipping container market.  With no 
practical substitutes for paper boxes, government concluded, inelastic supply of boxes 
would certainly increase prices.  From a public policy perspective, industry 
concentration equated to potential price hikes in paper boxes that would be extracted 
from consumers.  Without policy intervention, the FTC reasoned, technology and 
capital structure in the industry facilitated concentration. 68 
Paper boxes were usually manufactured at specialized box plants, which first 
fluted two-ton rolls of paper, and then converted the corrugated sheets into set-up 
boxes.  While large, vertically integrated pulp and paper firms dominated the industry, 
its competitive structure included an important share of independent converting firms 
that purchased the two-ton rolls from outside suppliers.  Citing technology and capital 
requirements, the FTC concluded that such independent converters had practically no 
capabilities to integrate backward into manufacture of pulp and paper.  In contrast, 
large-scale pulp and paper firms could easily enter converting, and gain important 
competitive advantages.  Vertically integrated producers “had considerable flexibility 
in their mix of internal transfers, exchanges, and sales,” argued the FTC.  “The mix 
can be varied as producers attempt to minimize delivered cost, and maximize profit in 
response to changes in the supply of or demand for medium.”69 
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The 1980’s witnessed two other major antimerger interventions in the paper 
container industry.  In 1984, Champion International Corporation acquired St. Regis 
Corporation for $1.84 billion, creating the second largest U.S. pulp and paper firm.  
The FTC argued that the resulting firm had too much market power in selected product 
segments.  In particular, the FTC alleged that the merger violated antitrust laws 
because it reduced competition in West Coast linerboard markets.  The merger went 
through only after Champion accepted a consent decree that required it to divest itself 
of a linerboard mill operated by Washington-based St. Regis.70  In 1987, the FTC 
prepared to apply a preliminary injunction against the proposed $130 million 
acquisition of Flexible Packaging Division of Princeton Packaging by the James River 
Corporation.  The FTC alleged that this merger of the two largest U.S. manufacturers 
of frozen food film would reduce competition in the manufacture and sale of frozen 
food film and grocery bags, and the companies abandoned the transaction71 
 
Conclusions 
Between 1950 and 1990, antitrust greatly influenced the organizational 
evolution of the U.S. pulp and paper industry.  Government’s extensive and sustained 
antitrust interventions in the industry were part of a much larger political movement 
that attempted to reconcile free enterprise with democracy.  In the case of pulp and 
paper, public policy emphasized the need to secure consumer welfare by preventing 
large mergers that potentially reduced competition and by policing trade practices 
deemed unfair.  Antitrust officials opened several dozen investigations into the pulp 
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and paper industry and litigated well over fifty cases.  In the process, they forced firms 
to alter dramatically their organizational strategy and behavior and ultimately reshaped 
the industry. 
The antitrust experience of pulp and paper between 1950 and 1990 can be 
divided roughly into two stages.  Between 1950 and the mid-1970s, questions of 
competitive structure dominated the antitrust framework.  Between 1970 and mid-
1980s, antitrust in pulp and paper centered on cartel and price fixing cases.  With 
inauguration of the Reagan administration, antitrust issues calmed significantly down 
in the pulp and paper industry.  It is beyond the scope of this report to assess if a truly 
novel antitrust regime took hold during the 1980s, but evidence does support this idea 
sufficiently to suggest further research on the issue is in order. 
Between 1950 and the mid-1970s, antitrust enforcement relied mostly on the 
Celler-Kefauver Act, which allowed officials to cancel or prevent mergers that they 
thought might injure the competitive structure of a given industry.  In the context of 
the pulp and paper industry, and indeed of the entire forest products industry, the 
challenged posed by the Act was to determine what constituted the relevant 
competitive structure.  Around 1950, the pulp and paper industry was fragmented into 
several distinct industry segments that were typically dominated by a few specialized 
firms.  Government chose to enforce the Celler-Kefauver Act in the context of these 
specialized segments, such as sanitary paper, bag paper, fine and printing paper, and 
many others. 
Such enforcement of the Celler-Kefauer Act undermined regional and product 
specialization of firms while encouraging geographical expansion and diversification.  
Similar conclusions have been drawn by a number of scholars for the economy as a 
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whole.72  In pulp and paper, political economy facilitated thorough transformation of 
the industry’s organizational strategy and structure, whereby firms adopting large- 
scale, multi-divisional structure had the best chances to survive legal challenges in 
merger cases. 
Government enforcement of the Celler-Kefauver Act disadvantaged pulp and 
paper firms whose traditional competitive strategy was based on specialization in 
regional markets or excellence in particular technology.  When such firms faced 
intensifying competition after 1950, their ability to respond through mergers and 
acquisitions that might have protected or expanded their existing market shares was 
restrained by antitrust officials.  Political economy either induced specialized firms to 
expand geographically or to diversify, or made them attractive targets of acquisition 
for firms looking to grow and diversify.  Increased diversification and size of firms 
probably accelerated the diffusion of certain forms of technological knowledge and 
learning, and thus may have significantly influenced the course of technological 
innovation in the industry.  Definitive assessment of this subject, however, is beyond 
the capacity of this study.  
Numerous voluminous antimerger cases suggest a deep-seated conflict between 
industry dynamics and public policy.  Managers of specialized firms preferred strategic 
acquisitions within their own industry segments, but such options were quickly 
constrained.  Government forged harsh segment-specific antimerger standards in high 
profile cases against Kimberly-Clark, International Paper, and many others firms. 
Government-issued divestiture orders cancelled several significant mergers.  More 
importantly, they set legal standards that other pulp and paper firms simply could not 
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ignore.  For this reason, the sheer number of investigations and legal cases does not 
reveal sufficiently the extent to which antitrust officials shaped the industry.  It is 
obvious, however, that political economy greatly influenced incentive structures that 
operated upon firms and managers, and thereby induced new forms of firm behavior. 
The conflict between internal industry dynamics and public policy existed, or 
emerged, in large measure because antitrust was implemented on a segment-specific 
basis.  Although antimerger enforcement by the FTC and the Department of Justice 
was carried out in the context of a larger policy framework, its execution and effect 
occurred within the context of specific industries and market sectors. 
The second phase of antitrust enforcement, which centered on extensive cartel 
and trade practice cases, was in contrast largely harmonious with the larger public 
policy framework.  Price-fixing litigation against large sectors of the pulp and paper 
industry intensified the competitive environment by maintaining and securing truly 
functioning markets for different paper commodities.  This second phase of post-
World War II antitrust experience also marked the stabilization of the competitive 
structure of U.S. pulp and paper industry within the framework of U.S. political 
economy.  Since the early 1980s, antitrust disputes in the industry have calmed 
significantly, though the threat of antirust remains a powerful force in the industry. 
 
